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The  relationship  between  money  and  nominal  GNP  has  been  generally  stable, 
financial  innovations  notwithstanding,  although  the  relationship  between 
the  monetary  base  and  nominal  GNP  has  been  slightly  more  predictable. 
Recently,  a  number  of  influential  policymakers 
have  argued  that  innovations  in  the  means  of  making 
payment  have  changed  past  relationships  between  the 
‘money  supply  and  aggregate  income  (see,  for  ex- 
ample,  Morris  [18],  Solomon  [20],  and  Wallich 
[21]),  These  policymakers  have  asserted  that  finan- 
cial  innovations  such  as  NOW  accounts,  money 
market  mutual  funds,  customer  repurchase  agree- 
ments,  and  deposit-sweeping  arrangements  obscure 
the  relationship  between  a  narrowly  defined  mone- 
tary  aggregate  such  as  M11  and  money  balances  held 
for  transactions  purposes.  The  apparent  plausibility 
of  this  view  has  spawned  the  corollary  notion  that 
Ml  should  be  replaced  as  a  primary  intermediate 
target2  for  monetary  policy.  Frank  Morris,  President 
of  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  Boston,  for  example, 
advocates  total  liquid  assets  (L)  as  an  “intermediate 
goal”  [18,  p.  9].  Others  have  simply  advocated  that 
the  FOMC  be  flexible  in  choosing  which  aggregate 
to  target. 
The  first  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  investigate 
whether  financial  innovations  have  indeed  obscured 
the  relationship  between  narrow  monetary  aggregates 
and  nominal  income.  On  the  basis  of  the  empirical 
evidence,  the  article  shows  that  contrary  to  popular 
opinion,  financial  innovations  did  not  have  a  sub- 
stantive  effect  on  the  relationship  between  M1  and 
GNP  over  the  period  examined,  1959  to  1981  (ex- 
cept  possibly  for  the  three-year  period  from  1975  to 
1978). 
1 M1  is  currently  defined  to  include  currency  and  coin, 
demand  deposits,  traveler’s  checks,  and  NOW  accounts. 
This  sum  was  named  M1B  in  1981.  For  simplification, 
whenever  M1  is  referred  to  in  this  article,  the  current 
definition  will  be  relevant. 
2 Under  current  operating  procedures,  nonborrowed  re- 
serves  are  used  as  the  operating  target.  M1,  therefore,  is 
called  an  intermediate  target-i.e.,  intermediate  between 
nonborrowed  reserves  and  nominal  GNP. 
This  is,  of  course,  not  to  say  that  financial  innova- 
tions  might  not  change  the  historical  relationship  of’ 
M1  to  GNP  at  some  future  date.  But  even  if  that 
relationship  changed,  there  is  another  money/income 
relationship,  namely  that  between  the  monetary  base3 
and  GNP,  that  is  thought  to  be  relatively  immune  to 
financial  innovations  (see  Meltzer  [17]  for  a  suc- 
cinct  explanation  of  this  assertion).  Therefore,  a 
second  purpose  of  this  paper  is  to  examine  the  mone- 
tary  base  to  see  whether  it  has  potential  as  an  inter- 
mediate  target  for  monetary  policy.  Several  recent 
studies  have  tended  to  dismiss  the  monetary  base  as 
an  intermediate  target  on  the  grounds  that  M1  has 
borne  a  closer  empirical  relationship  to  GNP  over 
the  years  than  has  the  monetary  base.  This  article 
reexamines  the  evidence  and  concludes  that  the  base 
actually  bore  a  slightly  more  predictable  relationship 
to  GNP  than  did  M1. 
Narrowly  Defined  Monetary  Aggregates  As  Tar- 
gets  for  Monetary  Policy  Milton  Friedman  has 
argued  that  “.  . . the  monetary  authority  should  guide 
itself  by  magnitudes  that  it  can  control,  not  by  ones 
that  it  cannot  control”  [7,  p.  486].  Broad  aggregates 
like  total  liquid  assets  are  not  (in  practice)  con- 
trollable  through  the  reserve  base,  whereas  narrowly 
defined  aggregates  can  be  controlled  through  the 
monetary  authority’s  control  over  bank  reserves,  the 
basis  for  monetary  expansions  and  contractions.4 
3 The  monetary  base  is  defined  as  the  sum  of  reserves 
held  at  the  Federal  Reserve  and  currency  and  coin 
outside  the  Federal  Reserve  System  and  the  Treasury. 
It  is  adjusted  for  changes  in  reserve  requirements.  In  all 
subsequent  discussion  of  the  monetary  base  in  this  article, 
the  figure  referred  to  will  be  the  monetary  base  as  con- 
structed  by  the  Federal  Reserve  Bank  of  St.  Louis. 
4 See  Goodfriend  [10]  for  an  analysis  of  this  issue.  Con- 
temporaneous  reserve  accounting,  of  course,  is  a  neces- 
sary  precondition  for  direct  control  of  money  through  the 
reserve  base. 
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trollable,  if  at  all,  only  through  measures  designed  to 
affect  interest  rates.  As  a  result,  they  are  subject  to 
considerably  larger  targeting  errors  than  are  nar- 
rowly  defined  monetary  aggregates.  Also,  in  at- 
tempting  to  stabilize  a  broad  aggregate  by  reacting 
to  changes  in  the  demand  for  credit,  the  monetary 
authority  may  actually  destabilize  the  economy.  This 
perverse  outcome  may  come  about  because  the  mone- 
tary  authority  may  misperceive  the  lag  between  a 
policy  action  and  the  subsequent  impact  of that  action 
on  the  economy.  Friedman  [7]  has  noted  that,  for 
this  reason,  past  Federal  Reserve  actions  designed  to 
stabilize  the  economy  have  nearly  always  proved  to 
be  destabilizing. 
The  argument  that  financial  innovations  can  cause 
loss  of  control  of  monetary  aggregates  is  not  new. 
On  the  contrary,  it  represents  a  resurrection  of  the 
well-known  Gurley-Shaw  thesis  [12]  that  was  dis- 
cussed  widely  in  the  economics  literature  in  the  late 
1950s.  This  thesis  held  that  near-monies  such  as 
deposit  liabilities  of  savings  and  loan  associations, 
savings  banks,  and  other  financial  intermediaries- 
which  were  outside  the  jurisdiction  of  the  Federal 
Reserve  System-rendered  monetary  policy  per  se 
useless  as  an  anti-inflationary  weapon.  In  particular, 
Gurley  and  Shaw  argued  that  the  Federal  Reserve 
could  not  stop  inflation  because  it  could  not  control 
nonbank  financial  intermediaries  and  thus  could  not 
limit  the  creation  of  near-monies  that  were  regarded 
as  effective  substitutes  for  Ml.  Accordingly,  the 
issue  in  the  fifties  was,  as  it  is  today,  whether  mone- 
tary  control  is  feasible  in  a  financial  system  that  can 
produce  an  endless  array  of  money  substitutes,  i.e., 
whether  an  easily  controllable  monetary  aggregate 
such  as  Ml  (or  the  monetary  base)  could  be  used  to 
control  the  entire  credit  superstructure  and  therefore 
total  spending. 
Both  the  Gurley  and  Shaw  thesis  and  the  current 
financial  innovations  argument  can  be  tested  empir- 
ically.  Both  propositions  imply  that  the  relationship 
between  money  and  nominal  GNP  is  extremely  vari- 
able  and  unpredictable.  Equivalently,  the  financial 
innovation  theses  imply  that  the  income  velocity  of 
money,  far  from  being  stable,  is  a  will-of-the-wisp. 
(By  definition,  MV  =  GNP,  where  M  is  a monetary 
aggregate  and  V  is  the  income  velocity  of  that  mone- 
tary  aggregate.) 
The  simplest  and  most  straightforward  way  of 
examining  the  relationship  between  money  and  GNP 
is  to  regress  the  percentage  change  in  GNP  on  the 
percentage  change  in  the  monetary  aggregate  (see 
Friedman  and  Meiselman  [8]).  This  method  is 
employed  below.  Before  presenting  the  model,  how- 
ever,  a  word  of  caution  is  in  order.  Results  from 
single-equation  regression  models  are  always  subject 
to  potential  statistical  difficulties.  Even  so,  the  evi- 
dence  reported  below  is  sufficient  to  demonstrate 
that  (1)  the  relationship  between  Ml  and  GNP  has 
been  generally  stable  except  for  one  three-year  peri- 
od,  and  (2)  the  monetary  base  has  also  borne  a  stable 
relationship  to  GNP.  The  analysis  will  proceed  by 
first  examining  the  relationship  of  Ml  to  GNP  and, 
subsequently  the  relationship  of  the  monetary  base  to 
GNP. 
The  Relationship  of  Ml  to  GNP:  The  Empirical 
Evidence  Countless  analyses  of  GNP  and  Ml 
have  been  undertaken  for  different  reasons  since 
Friedman  and  Meiselman.  One  recent  analysis  per- 
formed  by  Richard  Davis  [5]  is  shown  below. 
Davis  used  a  single-equation  model  of  the  form, 
where  g  is  the  percentage  change  in  nominal  GNP 
and  m  is  the  percentage  change  in  M1.  This  model 
is  employed  in  the  present  article.5 
Parameter  estimates  in  a  model  such  as  this  will 
be  influenced  by  the  state  of  the  economy  at  the  end 
of  the  estimation  period.  As  Friedman  concluded  on 
the  basis  of an  extensive  historical  study,  “.  . . income 
velocity  tends  to  rise  during  cyclical  expansions  when 
real  income  is  rising  and  to  fall  during  cyclical  con- 
tractions  when  real  income  is  falling”  [6,  p.  329]. 
Consequently,  in  order  to  minimize  possible  bias  from 
that  source,  the  regression  coefficients  for  this  study 
were  always  estimated  over  a period  from  one  quarter 
before  the  peak  of  one  business  cycle  (as  defined  by 
the  NBER)  to  one  quarter  before  the  peak  of  an- 
other.6 
The  results  of  the  regressions  estimated  (with 
quarterly  data)  from  1959-IV  to  1969-W,  1959-IV 
to  1973-III,  and  1959-IV  to  1979-IV  are  shown  in 
Table  I.  In-sample  results  by  themselves,  while  of 
some  interest,  cannot  give  much  information  about 
the  long-run  stability  of  M1  velocity.  Thus,  the 
equations  were  simulated  dynamically  from  the  fourth 
5 The  Davis  equation  was  used  as  a model  for  the  analy- 
sis  because  he  concluded  that  M1  was  more  closely 
related  to  GNP  than  was  the  monetary  base.  This  article 
subsequently  examines  that  question,  as  noted  before, 
and  his  form  of  the  equation  will  be  used  to  evaluate  his 
conclusion.  The  equation  was  estimated  with  uncon- 
strained  lags. 
6 See  Cullison  [4]  for  an  example  of  the  pitfalls  that  can 
be  associated  with  disregarding  Friedman’s  advice. 
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GNP  AND  OUT-OF-SAMPLE  SIMULATIONS  OF  GNP  FROM 
M1 AND  M1 ADJUSTED  FOR  THE  1975  -  1978  VELOCITY  SHIFT 
quarter  of  1959  through  fourth  quarter  of  1981.7 
Chart  1  shows  the  resulting  out-of-sample  forecasts 
(from  1959-69  and  1959-73  data)  plotted  against 
actual  GNP.  As  is  apparent,  the  equations  predicted 
nominal  GNP  fairly  accurately  until  the  second  quar- 
ter  of  1975,  when  velocity  growth  rose  as  the  econ- 
omy  moved  out  of  the  recession.  The  simulation 
began  to  track  the  changes  in  the  actual  GNP  again 
in  1978,8  although  simulated  GNP  was  at  a  lower 
level. 
After  an  ad  hoc  adjustment  was  made  to  simulated 
GNP  to  account  for  the  1975-78  velocity  shift,  the 
forecasts  came  back  on  track.  The  adjustment  in- 
volved  adding  0.5  percent  per  quarter  to  the  percent- 
age  change  in  nominal  GNP  over  the  period  from 
1975-11  to  1978-11.  Chart  1 also  shows  the  out-of- 
sample  simulation  of  GNP  forecasted  from  M1  with 
7  In  the  dynamic  simulations,  the  regression  equation 
predicts  the  percentage  change  in  nominal  GNP.  Actual 
GNP  in  the  beginning  period  is  used  as  the  base  and 
never  again  enters  the  simulation. 
*Thanks  are  due  Stephen  Hale  for  pointing  this  out  to 
me. 
that  adjustment,  and  Table  II  reports  the  forecast 
errors  in  the  out-of-sample  period.  As  the  table 
shows,  the  simulations  adjusted  for  the  velocity  shift 
missed  actual  fourth  quarter  1981  GNP  by  only  $34.1 
billion  (1.1  percent)  in  the  simulation  from  the  pa- 
rameters  estimated  from  1959-69  data  and  only  $2.3 
billion  (0.08  percent)  in  the  simulation  based  upon 
1959-73  data.  Considering  that  these  were  dynamic 
simulations  with  the  only  actual  GNP  data  entering 
the  forecasts  coming  in  1959-IV  (the  beginning  of the 
simulation),  the  closeness  of  the  forecasts  to  actual 
GNP  in  the  post-sample  period  is  striking. 
During  1981,  nationwide  NOW  account  owner- 
ship  was  authorized  and  NOW  accounts,  a  compon- 
ent  of  M1,  grew  rapidly.  At  the  same  time,  the 
economy  experienced  an  immense  increase  in  out- 
standing  shares  of  money  market  mutual  funds. 
Money  market  mutual  fund  shares,  while  checkable 
(under  certain  restrictions),  are  not  included  in  M1. 
Could  the  relationship  of  predicted  to  actual  GNP 
have  remained  so  close  in  1981  if  financial  innova- 
tions  had  obscured  the  relationship  of  M1  to  GNP  ? 
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tion  to  a  monetary  aggregate  denoted  shift-adjusted 
M1B-i.e.,  MI  adjusted  to  remove  any  shifts  from 
time  and  savings  deposits  into  NOW  accounts.  That 
aggregate  was  also  tested  in  the  simulations  of  GNP 
in  1981.  The  NOW-shift  adjusted  simulation  gave 
considerably  poorer  results  than  did  the  simulation 
based  upon  actual  M1.9  This  result  was  somewhat 
puzzling,  for  it  implied  that  the  NOW-shift  adjust- 
9 The  root  mean  squared  error  for  1981  of  GNP  simu- 
lated  from  Ml  was  $44  billion  compared  to  $76.5  billion 
for  GNP  simulated  from  M1  adjusted  for  the  shift  into 
NOW  accounts.  ‘Additionally,  the  geometric  averages  of 
the  quarterly  percentage  changes  in  actual  GNP  and  the 
GNP  simulations  for  1981  were  9.69  percent  for  actual 
GNP,  and  10.2 percent  for  GNP  simulated  from  M1,  but 
only  7.5 percent  for  GNP  simulated  from  “shift-adjusted 
M1B.” 
ment  was  faulty  and  that  M1  (then  M1B)  continued 
to  be  the  appropriate  measure  of  transactions  ac- 
counts.  One  explanation  may  be  that  money  market 
mutual  funds  were  absorbing  funds  designed  for 
savings  whereas  NOW  accounts  were  absorbing 
transactions  balances.  The  1981  experience  does 
illustrate  that  financial  innovations  have  made  mone- 
tary  targeting  more  difficult. 
These  simulation  results,  in  any  event,  are  not  con- 
sistent  with  an  unstable  and  unpredictable  relation- 
ship  between  M1  and  GNP.  Therefore,  econometric 
money  demand  equations  that  are  unstable  and  un- 
predictable  may  well  be  misspecified.  (See  also 
Hafer  and  Hein  [13]  and  Hetzel  [14]  who  reach 
similar  conclusions  using  different  methodology.) 
Marvin  Goodfriend  [11]  has  shown  that  there  are 
Table  I 
RESULTS  OF  REGRESSIONS  OF  GNP  ON  THE  ST.  LOUIS  MONETARY  BASE  AND  M1* 
(All  variables  are  represented  as  quarter-by-quarter  percentage  changes.  All  lags  are  unconstrained.) 
(M  is equal  to  M1) 
1.60  0.0072 
1.88  0.0076 
1.80  0.0083 
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OUT-OF-PERIOD  FORECASTING  ERRORS  FOR 
QUARTERLY  GNP  FROM  DYNAMIC 
SIMULATIONS  ENDING  IN  1981-IV** 
Actual 
1981-IV  GNP  Number  of  Root Mean 
Date  Forecast 
Began 
Less  Out-of-Sample  Squared 
Estimated  GNP  Quarters  Error 
$ billions  $ billions 
1970-l 
M1  (Eq.  1)*  176.7  48  119.9 
M1  Adjusted†  34.1  48  29.3 
Monetary  Base 
(Eq.  4)*  57.3  48  31.2 
Monetary  Base 
(Eq.  7)*  43.8  48  35.0 
Trend  Alone  -  446.3  48  156.0 
1973-w 
M1  (Eq.  2)*  142.0  33  98.5 
M1  Adjusted†  -  2.3  33  23.0 
Monetary  Bore 
(Eq.  5)*  47.1  33  36.9 
Monetary  Base 
(Eq.  8)*  45.6  33  41.2 
Trend  Alone  -  374.8  33  147.4 
1980-I 
M1  (Eq.  3)*  -37.8  8  34.7 
Monetary  Base 
(Eq.  9)*  -21.5  8  32.9 
Trend  Alone  -  158.5  8  41.6 
*  Equation  numbers  refer  to  regression  equations  in  Table  I  from 
which  simulations  were  made. 
**All  dynamic  simulations  began  on  1959-IV.  Forecast  errors, 
however,  include  only  those  errors  that  began  after  the  estimation 
period. 
† Adjustment  on  the  M1  simulations  adds  0.5  percent  (2  percent 
annual  rate)  per  quarter  to  the  simulated  change  in  GNP  over 
the  1975-II  to  1978-II  time  period. 
sound  theoretical  reasons  to  believe  that  conventional 
money  demand  equations  are  indeed  misspecified. 
There  remains,  however,  the  troublesome  fact  that 
the  rate  of  growth  of  income  velocity  of  M1  appar- 
ently  did  increase  in  the  1975-78  period.  One  can 
adjust  for  such  shifts  on  an  ex  post  basis,  but  if  an 
aggregate  is  to  be  an  appropriate  target  for  mone- 
tary  policy,  such  shifts  should  be  predictable  ex 
ante.  Fortunately,  there  is  another  narrowly  defined 
monetary  aggregate  whose  relationship  to  nominal 
GNP  did  not  shift  through  the  fourth  quarter  of 
1981-one  that  is  amenable  to  control  by  the  mone- 
tary  authority.  That  variable  is  the  monetary  base. 
The  Relationship  of  the  Monetary  Base  to  GNP 
Three  Federal  Reserve  articles  have  recently  con- 
sidered  the  monetary  base  as  a  policy  target  (John 
Carlson  [2],  Richard  Davis  [5],  and  Carl  Gambs 
[9]).  Their  conclusions  were  generally  unfavorable 
toward  the  base,  although  all  agreed  that  the  base 
could  be  better  controlled  than  other  monetary  aggre- 
gates,  even  under  current  institutional  arrangements. 
All  three  articles  concluded  that  the  empirical  evi- 
dence  weighed  against  using  the  monetary  base  as  a 
policy  target  because  it  was  not  as  closely  related  to 
nominal  GNP  as  was  M1.  In  addition,  the  studies 
enumerated  several  theoretical  reservations  against 
targeting  the  monetary  base.  This  article  will  focus 
primarily  on  the  empirical  arguments  against  the 
base,  although  the  theoretical  reservations  voiced  in 
the  articles  will  be  discussed. 
The  Davis  and  Gambs  studies  (which  contained 
the  empirical  work)  reach  the  conclusion  that  the 
base  is  less  closely  related  to  aggregate  demand  by 
comparing  the  correlation  coefficients  of  regressions 
of nominal  GNP  on  money  with  those  of  GNP  on  the 
monetary  base.  There  are  slight  variations  in  tech- 
niques,  but  each  used  current  and  lagged  values  of 
the  monetary  variables  to  estimate  his  single-equation 
model.  As  is  shown  in  Table  I,  this  article’s  regres- 
sions  of  GNP  on  the  base  and  on  M1  were  consistent 
with  the  result  found  by  Davis  and  Gambs,  namely 
that  the  multiple  correlation  coefficients  of  the  M1/ 
GNP  regressions  were  higher  than  the  multiple  cor- 
relation  coefficients  of  the  base/GNP  regressions. 
Both  papers,  however,  gave  insufficient  attention  to  a 
very  important  criterion,  forecast  performance  in  out- 
of-sample  simulations.  That  omission  is  illustrated 
in  Chart  2. 
Chart  2 shows  actual  GNP  and  two  dynamic  simu- 
lations  of  GNP  in  out-of-sample  periods.  One  is 
based  upon  a  regression  of  GNP  on  M1  (without 
adjustment  for  the  1975-78  velocity  shift).  The 
other  is  based  upon  a  regression  of  GNP  on  the 
monetary  base.  The  chart  shows  out-of-period  fore- 
casts  from  parameters  estimated  from  1959-IV  to 
1969-IV,  and  from  1959-IV  to  1973-III.  GNP 
simulated  from  M1  began  to  go  off  track  in  the 
second  quarter  of  1975,  but  GNP  simulated  from  the 
monetary  base  continued  to  track  nominal  GNP 
through  the  fourth  quarter  of  1981.  This  result 
contradicts  Davis  and  Gambs’s  conclusion  that  the 
monetary  base  is  less  closely  related  to  GNP  than  is 
M1.  Note  that  this  contradiction  occurs  even  though 
the  multiple  correlation  coefficients  were  consistently 
higher  for  the  regressions  of  GNP  on  M1  than  for 
the  regressions  of  GNP  on  the  base. 
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GNP  AND  OUT-OF-SAMPLE  SIMULATIONS 
OF  GNP  FROM  M1 AND  THE  MONETARY  BASE 
Table  II  provides  measures  of  the  dynamic  track-  This  particular  lag  structure  was  chosen  because  it 
ing  ability  of  the  out-of-sample  simulations.  As  the  avoids  current  period  relations  between  the  base  and 
table  shows,  GNP  simulated  from  the  monetary  base  GNP,  and  it  is  relatively  uncomplicated.  Avoidance 
always  ended  up  closer  to  actual  fourth  quarter  1981  of  contemporary  relationships  between  GNP  and  the 
GNP  than  GNP  simulated  from  M1  (not  adjusted  base  is  predicated  upon  the  assumption  that  changes 
for  the  velocity  shift).  The  root  mean  squared  error  in  the  monetary  base  affect  GNP  only  after  a  lapse 
(RMSE),10  a  measure  of  overall  forecasting  error  of  time.  As  can  be  seen  from  Table  I,  in  the  pre- 
reported  in  Table  II,  also  shows  smaller  errors  for  ferred  lag  form  the  bulk  of  the  effects  of  changes  in 
the  simulations  derived  from  the  monetary  base.  the  base  on  GNP  take  place  with  a  two-quarter  lag. 
The  monetary  base/GNP  equation  was  specified 
to  conform  to  Davis’s  analysis.  Having  no  further 
need  of  this  specification,  the  monetary  base/GNP 
relationship  was  reestimated  using  a  different  lag 
structure.  This  preferred  equation  regresses  the  per- 
centage  change  in  GNP  on  percentage  changes  in  the 
monetary  base  over  the  two  previous  quarters.  The 
results  are  reported  in  Table  I,  and  simulations  from 
them  are  evaluated  in  Table  II. 
10 The  RMSE  is  defined  as  the  square  root  of  the  sum 
of  the  squared  forecasting  errors  divided  by  the  number 
of  forecasted  periods.  The  squaring  procedure  not  only 
prevents  negative  errors  from  offsetting  positive  errors 
in  the  summing  up,  but  it  also  penalizes  large  errors  more 
than  proportionately. 
The  out-of-sample  forecasting  errors  (in  percent- 
ages) of  the  simulations  of  GNP  from  the  preferred 
monetary  base  equation,  from  M1,  and  from  M1 
adjusted  for  the  velocity  shift  are  shown  in  Chart  3. 
(The  relative  accuracy  of the  forecasts  is more  appar- 
ent  from  percentage  errors  than  from  levels.)  GNP 
simulated  from  M1  adjusted  for  the  velocity  shift 
outperformed  GNP  simulated  from  the  monetary 
base  during  the  1973-76  period,  although  they  were 
virtually  identical  before  and  after.  The  simulation 
from  the  monetary  base,  however,  substantially  out- 
performed  the  simulation  from  unadjusted  M1.  Thus, 
the  simulation  from  the  base  did  not  predict  the  1973- 
75  recession,  while  the  simulation  from  M1  did  not 
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1975-78  period. 
The  failure  of  the  base  to  predict  the  1973-75  re- 
cession  represents  a  shortcoming  in  its  feasibility  as  a 
target  for  monetary  policy.  Note,  however,  that  the 
base  came  back  on  track  after  the  recession  with  no 
ad  hoc  adjustment,  and  it  did  not  mispredict  the  other 
out-of-sample  recessions.  The  explanation  may  lie 
in  the  character  of  the  1973-75  recession,  which 
began  with  the  oil  embargo  and  was  influenced 
throughout  by  energy  supply  effects.  If,  as  many 
economists  believe,  the  base  is  less  influenced  by 
feedback  from  GNP  than  is  M1,11  M1  might  be 
expected  to  show  the  effects  of  the  1973-75  recession 
11 This  paper’s  regression  results  reported  in  Table  I 
indicate  that  the  contemporaneous  relationship  between 
M1  and  GNP  was  more  pronounced  than  the  relationship 
between  the  base  and  GNP.  The  result  is  consistent 
with,  but  no  proof  of,  the  explanation  advanced  above. 
Chart  3 
PERCENTAGE  ERRORS  IN  PREDICTING 
GNP  FROM  M1  AND  THE  MONETARY  BASE 
SAMPLE  PERIOD  1959-l\/ to  1969-IV 
more  closely  than  would  the  monetary  base.12  The 
failure  of  the  base  to  predict  the  1973-75  recession, 
however,  should  provide  a  caution  to  anyone  relying 
solely  upon  it  as  a  forecasting  tool.13 
Chart  4  shows  actual  GNP  plotted  against  simu- 
lations  of  GNP  from  the  preferred  monetary  base 
equation  and  from  GNP’s  own  trend.  The  chart 
clearly  shows  that  GNP  simulated  from  the  trend 
extrapolation  is  subject  to  substantially  higher  fore- 
cast  error  than  GNP  simulated  from  the  monetary 
aggregates.  Table  II,  which  reports  the  out-of-period 
forecasting  statistics,  confirms  this  visual  observation. 
Are  Monetary  Aggregates  Endogenous  or  Exog- 
enous?  The  empirical.  relationship  between  the 
monetary  base  and  GNP  has  been  dismissed  by  some 
analysts  on  the  ground  that  the  base  is  endogenous 
to  GNP  (i.e.,  that  the  base  responds  to  changes  in 
GNP  rather  than  vice  versa).  This  contention  is 
difficult  to  resolve.  Like  the  money  supply,  the 
monetary  base  has  passed  statistical  causality  tests 
that  indicate  that  the  monetary  aggregates  add  some- 
12  If  adjustment  of  currency  holdings  is  more  costly  than 
adjustment  of  demand  deposits,  the  result  can  also  be 
consistent  with  a  transaction  cost  analysis  of  the  demand 
for  money  that  distinguishes  between  transitory  and 
permanent  input  variable  changes  (see,  for  example, 
Goodfriend  [11]).  Such  analysis  would  seem  to  be  able 
to  rationalize  why  M1  should  track  transitory  changes  in 
income  better  than  the  monetary  base. 
Finally,  the  explanation  might  be  advanced  that  in- 
herent  technical  problems  related  to  the  composition  of 
the  base  caused  the  base  to  mispredict  the  1973-75  reces- 
sion.  It  is  indeed  true  that  a  trend  toward  a  larger  pro- 
portion  of  currency  in  the  base  seemed  to  begin  some- 
where  around  1973.  As  a  result,  currency  increased  from 
65.8  percent  of  the  base  in  the  fourth  quarter  of  1973  to 
68.8  percent  by  the  third  quarter  of  1976,  a  rate  of  in- 
crease  of  approximately  0.4  percent  per  quarter.  This 
trend  in  the  currency  composition  of  the  base  has  con- 
tinued  since  that  time,  however,  although  at  a  slower  0.2 
percent  per  quarter  rate.  Given,  however,  that  the  pre- 
dictions  from  the  base  came  back  on  track  of  their  own 
accord  even  though  the  composition  of  the  base  was 
continuing  to  change;  and  given  that  the  parameters  of 
the  equations  from  which  the  simulations  were  made 
were  estimated  during  a  period  in  which  there  was  very 
little  change  in  the  composition  of  the  base  (0.06  percent 
per  quarter),  compositional  changes  seem  an  unlikely 
explanation  of  the  miss  in  the  1973-76  period. 
13  In  comparison  to  the  forecasters  reported  by  Stephen 
McNees  [15]  in  his  article  evaluating  forecast  perform- 
ance  over  the  1976-11  to  1980-111  period,  however,  the 
simple  base  equation  estimated  over  the  1959-IV  to  1973- 
III  period  (Equation  8  in  Table  I)  performed  respect- 
ably.  In  terms  of  one-quarter  forecast  horizons,  the 
average  absolute  error  from  the  base  equation  turned  out 
to  be  3.27  percent,  measured  at  a  compound  annual  rate, 
which  was  lower  than  nine  of  the  sixteen  average  forecast 
errors  reported  by  McNees.  Using  the  base  equation-  to 
forecast  two  quarters  out  (this  could  be  done  by  assum- 
ing  that  the  rate  of  growth  of  the  base  in  time  period 
t-1  was  the  same  as  in  t-2,  which  would  be  known), 
the  average  absolute  error  turned  out  to  be  2.4  percent, 
which  was  as  low  as  that  of  any  forecaster  reported  in 
McNees’s  article. 
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AND  THE  MONETARY  BASE 
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thing  to  predicting  GNP  whereas  GNP  adds  little  or 
nothing  to  predicting  the  monetary  aggregates.  The 
power  of these  tests  is somewhat  limited,  however,  for 
there  is  a contemporaneous  relationship  between  both 
aggregates  and  GNP  (although  Table  I  shows  the 
contemporaneous  M1/GNP  relationship  to  be  more 
pronounced). 
To  illustrate  this  problem,  suppose  the  Federal 
Reserve  System  were  using  an  interest  rate  target 
while  nominal  GNP  and  hence  demands  for  liquidity 
were  rising  rapidly.  In  this  case,  interest  rates  would 
be  under  upward  pressure,  so  the  System  would 
provide  reserves  to  keep  short-term  rates  down.  In- 
creases  in  nominal  GNP  would  thus  be  correlated 
with  concurrent  increases  in  the  monetary  base  and 
M1.  A  monetarist  would  argue  that  these  contempo- 
raneous  changes  in  the  monetary  aggregates  would 
have  feedback  effects  on  GNP  that  would  show  up  a 
few  months  later. 
The  endogeneity  argument  provides  an  additional 
reason  to  prefer  a  base/GNP  regression  that  avoids 
the  contemporaneous  relationship.  It  must  be  ac- 
knowledged,  however,  that  avoidance  of  the  con- 
temporaneous  relationship  does  not  answer  the  endo- 
geneity  charge,  for  the  one-  and  two-quarter  lags 
could  be  providing  a  proxy  for  concurrent  changes. 
Some  simple  tests  were  run  to  show  that  the  fit  of 
the  regression  of  GNP  on  GNP  lagged  one,  two,  and 
three  periods  was  substantially  improved  by  adding 
the  base  lagged  one  and  two  periods,  and  that  the  fit 
of a  regression  of  the  monetary  base  on  the  monetary 
base  lagged  one  period  was  not  significantly  improved 
by  adding  GNP  lagged  one  and  two  periods.  The 
results  of  these  regressions  are  reported  in  the  ap- 
pendix,  along  with  measures  of  their  out-of-sample 
forecasting  accuracy.  These  results  are  all  consistent 
with  a causal  relationship  running  from  the  monetary 
aggregates  to  GNP.  Other  studies  have  come  to  simi- 
lar  conclusions  (see  Cagan  [3],  Hetzel  [14],  Mehra 
[16],  and  Sims  [19]).  Because  of  the  contempo- 
raneous  relationship  between  GNP  and  the  monetary 
aggregates,  however,  the  direction  of  causation  can- 
not  be  conclusively  demonstrated  by  analyses  such  as 
these. 
Conceptual  Reservations  to  Using  the  Base  As  a 
Target  for  Monetary  Policy  The  conceptual 
reservations  to  targeting  the  monetary  base,  men- 
tioned  earlier,  are  related  to  the  definition  of  the 
monetary  base.  The  base  is  defined  as  the  sum  of 
(1)  currency  outside  the  Federal  Reserve  System 
and  the  Treasury  and  (2)  bank  deposits  at  the 
Federal  Reserve.  Since  currency  accounts  for  over 
70  percent  of  the  base,  many  economists  argue  that 
currency  changes  would  be  given  disproportionate 
weight  if the  monetary  base  were  the  target  for  mone- 
tary  policy.  This  is  particularly  true  since  a  dollar 
of  bank  reserves  can  support  multiple  dollars  of 
money  and  credit. 
The  argument  continues  that  if  the  Federal  Re- 
serve  System  were  to  react  to  changes  in  the  demand 
for  currency  by  making  offsetting  changes  in  bank 
reserves,  the  resulting  effects  on  the  economy  would 
be  destabilizing.  As  a  result,  targeting  total  (or 
nonborrowed  reserves)  and  excluding  currency  has 
often  been  suggested  as  an  alternative  to  targeting 
the  monetary  base. 
Advocates  of  targeting  the  base  answer  that  cur- 
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along  with  bank  reserves,  is  a balance  sheet  item  (lia- 
bility)  for  the  Federal  Reserve  System.  Thus, 
changes  in  the  total  base  measure  changes  in  the  asset 
side  of  the  Federal  Reserve  balance  sheet  and,  hence, 
measure  Federal  Reserve  open  market  actions. 
Therefore,  the  argument  goes,  no  distinction  should 
be  made  between  the  components  of  the  base. 
To  test  this  proposition,  regressions  were  run  of 
GNP  on  currency  and  on  total  reserves  (adjusted  for 
reserve  requirement  changes)  from  1959-IV  to  1973- 
III,  and  the  results  were  simulated  dynamically 
through  the  fourth  quarter  of  1981.  Both  simulations, 
shown  in  Chart  5, went  off  track.  Moreover,  both  of 
the  component  simulations  underpredict  nominal 
GNP;  the  differences  were  not  offsetting.  This  result 
implies  that  the  monetary  base  as  a  whole  is  more 
closely  related  to  GNP  than  is  its  components.  And 
that  result,  if  correct,  would  seem  to  contradict  the 
conceptual  argument  advanced  against  the  base  at 
the  beginning  of  this  section  (i.e.,  that  currency 
changes  are  given  disproportionate  weight  by  the 
base). 
Phillip  Cagan  [3]  recently  provided  another  analy- 
sis  of  the  currency  issue.  He  also  thought  that  cur- 
rency  was  a  questionable  indicator  of  economic  ac- 
tivity.  He  argued  that  reserves  and  checkable  de- 
posits  are  highly  correlated  and  both  provide  the 
same  information  about  the  economy,  implying  that 
the  reserve  portion  of  the  monetary  base  was  the 
more  important  indicator  of  the  effects  of  money  on 
GNP.  Using  a modified  Granger-Sims  test,  he  found 
that  “.  . . when  concurrent  values  are  omitted,  neither 
set  of  growth  rates  [of  checkable  deposits  or  the 
monetary  base]  can  be  shown  by  this  test  to  add 
significant  information  not  contained  in  the  other” 
[3,  p.  29].  His  test  pertained  to  in-sample  data  over 
the  period  from  1953-III  to  1974-IV. 
Using  the  methods  outlined  previously  in  this 
article,  the  percentage  change  in  GNP  was  regressed 
on  lagged  values  of  the  percentage  change  in  check- 
able  deposits  over  the  1959-IV  to  1973-III  period. 
The  simulations  therefrom  are  shown  in  Chart  6 
compared  to  actual  GNP  and  GNP  simulated  from 
the  monetary  base.  The  out-of-sample  simulation 
from  checkable  deposits  did  not  track  nominal  GNP 
at  all  well.14 
14  The  equation  form  specified  for  Chart  6  was  similar 
to  that  for  the  “preferred  base”  simulation  (Equations  6, 
7,  and  8  in  Table  I),  having  checkable  deposits  lagged 
one  and  two  quarters.  An  alternative  specification  was 
also  tried,  using  checkable  deposits  with  five  lagged 
quarters,  but  the  simulation  results  were  not  appreciably 
different  from  those  illustrated  in  the  chart. 
Chart  5 
GNP AND  OUT-OF-SAMPLE 
SIMULATIONS  OF  GNP  FROM  THE 
MONETARY  BASE,  CURRENCY  HOLDINGS, 
AND  BANK  RESERVES 
(Bank  Reserves Adjusted  for  Changes in 
Reserve Requirements  by St.  Louis Method) 
These  last  results  combine  with  simulations  from 
currency  and  reserves  to  favor  those  who  recognize 
no  distinction  between  the  components  of  the  mone- 
tary  base.  This  conclusion  deserves  further  testing, 
however. 
Conclusion  This  article  presents  statistical  re- 
sults  demonstrating  that  the  trend  in  income  velocity 
of  the  monetary  base  remained  remarkably  constant 
from  1959  to  1981  and  that  the  trend  in  income  veloc- 
ity  of  M1  also  remained  remarkably  constant  except 
for  the  three-year  period  from  1975  to  1978. 
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SIMULATIONS  OF  GNP  FROM  THE 
MONETARY  BASE AND  FROM 
CHECKABLE  DEPOSITS 
These  results  imply  (1)  that  the  demand  for  money 
(M1)  has  been  generally  stable  since  1959  but  that 
(2)  the  monetary  base  has  borne  a  slightly  closer 
and  more  predictable  relationship  to  the  long-run 
trend  in  GNP  than  has  M1.15 
As  noted  at  the  outset,  the  argument  has  often 
been  made  that  financial  innovations  such  as  retail 
repurchase  arrangements,  money  market  mutual 
funds,  Eurodollars,  and  NOW  accounts  have  ob- 
scured  past  relationships  of  monetary  aggregates  to 
nominal  income.  And  if  financial  innovations  have 
15 See  also  Andersen  and  Karnosky  [1],  who  reached  a 
similar  conclusion  using  somewhat  similar  methodology 
in  1977. 
indeed  rendered  money/income  relationships  mean- 
ingless,  so  the  argument  goes,  then  narrow  monetary 
aggregates  should  be  scrapped  as  targets  for  mone- 
tary  policy.  The  analysis  in  this  article  suggests, 
however,  that  (except  possibly  for  M1  during  1975- 
78)  the  much  heralded  financial  innovations  had  no 
substantial  impact  upon  the  relationships  between  the 
narrow  monetary  aggregates  and  nominal  GNP 
through  the  fourth  quarter  of  1981. 
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APPENDIX 
ILLUSTRATION  OF.  NECESSARY  (BUT  NOT  SUFFICIENT)  CONDITIONS 
FOR  THE  MONETARY  BASE  TO  BE  EXOGENOUS  TO  NOMINAL  GNP 
(sample  period  from  1959-IV  to  1973-III) 
Multiple  Correlation  Coefficients  Root Mean  Squared  Errors 
Form  of  Equation 
(uncorrected  for  degrees  (forecast  period  from  1973-W 
of  freedom)  to  1981-IV,  33  observations) 
0.310  $ 39.87 
0.142  146.45 
0.59  3.71 
0.61  3.25 
0.50  4.21 
Definitions:  g  =  percentage  change  in  nominal  GNP, ß  =  percentage  change  in  St:  Louis  monetary  base. 
regressions  with  unconstrained  lags,  estimated  by  ordinary  least  squarer. 
Equations  are  linear 
F  test  for  significance  of  differences  in  multiple  correlation  coefficients  from  Kmenta,  Elements  of  Econometrics  (New  York:  Macmillan 
and  Company,  1971),  p.  371. 
For  Eq.  1  versus  Eq.  2,  F(2,50)  =  6.09* 
For  Eq.  3  versus  Eq.  5,  F(2,52)  =  0.63** 
For  Eq.  4  versus  Eq.  5,  F(3,51)  =  1.31** 
*  Significantly  different  at  0.01. 
**  Not  significantly  different  at  0.10. 
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